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Abstract:
Mobile ad-hoc networks rely on the cooperation of
nodes for routing and forwarding. For individual nodes
there are however several advantages resulting from
noncooperation, the most obvious being power saving.
Nodes that act selfishly or even maliciously pose a
threat to availability in mobile ad-hoc networks. Sev-
eral approaches have been proposed to detect nonco-
operative nodes. In this paper, we investigate the effect
of using rumors with respect to the detection time of
misbehaved nodes as well as the robustness of the rep-
utation system against wrong accusations. We propose
a Bayesian approach for reputation representation, up-
dates, and view integration. We also present a mech-
anism to detect and exclude potential lies. The simu-
lation results indicate that by using this Bayesian ap-
proach, the reputation system is robust against slander
while still benefitting from the speed-up in detection
time provided by the use of rumors.
1 Introduction
Unmanaged mobile ad-hoc networks do not have any
infrastructure at their disposal to ensure correct behav-
ior, the functioning of the network relies on the cooper-
ation of all the nodes. Cooperation is needed more but
harder to enforce than in an infrastructure-based net-
work. Nodes can arbitrarily join or leave the network.
For the lack of infrastructure, detection of misbehavior
and subsequent isolation of a misbehaved node has to
work in a distributed fashion. Several distributed repu-
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tation systems have been proposed to gather informa-
tion about the behavior of nodes and to evaluate them
for future cooperation in mobile ad-hoc or peer-to-peer
networks, some of these approaches are described in
Section 2. The rationale for using positive, negative, or
both kinds of reputation as well as for using rumors or
relying exclusively on first-hand observations are dis-
cussed in Section 3. In this paper we investigate the
trade-off between robustness and efficiency of using ru-
mors and propose a mechanism to filter out slander by
using Bayesian statistics and excluding seemingly im-
plausible opinions while retaining as much as possible
of the detection speed-up given by second-hand infor-
mation for a distributed reputation system in Section 4.
In Section 5 we present our simulation methodology
and results for an evaluation of the effect of rumours
on a reputation system in mobile ad-hoc networks. Sec-
tion 6 offers a discussion and future directions, and Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper.
2 Reputation Systems for Mobile
ad-hoc and Peer-to-Peer Net-
works
Watchdog and pathrater components to mitigate rout-
ing misbehavior have been proposed by Marti, Giuli,
Lai and Baker [11]. They observed increased through-
put in mobile ad-hoc networks by complementing DSR
with a watchdog for detection of denied packet forward-
ing and a pathrater for trust management and routing
policy rating every path used, which enable nodes to
avoid malicious nodes in their routes as a reaction. The
nodes rely on their own watchdog exclusively and do
not exchange reputation information with others.
CONFIDANT (see our papers [4, 3]) stands for ‘Coop-
eration Of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeT-
works’ and it detects malicious nodes by means of
observation or reports about several types of attacks
and thus allows nodes to route around misbehaved
nodes and to isolate them from the network. Nodes
have a monitor for observations, reputation records for
first-hand and trusted second-hand observations, trust
records to control trust given to received warnings, and
a path manager for nodes to adapt their behavior ac-
cording to reputation. Simulations for “no forwarding”
have shown that CONFIDANT can cope well even with
half of the network population acting maliciously. The
protocol uses also second-hand information, i.e. obser-
vations by others, which can be a vulnerability in the
presence of liars.
A reputation-based trust management has been in-
troduced by Aberer and Despotovic in the context of
peer-to-peer systems [1], using the data provided by a
decentralized storage method (P-Grid) as a basis for a
data-mining analysis to assess the probability that an
agent will cheat in the future given the information of
past transactions.
CORE, a collaborative reputation mechanism proposed
by Michiardi and Molva [12], also has a watchdog com-
ponent; however it is complemented by a reputation
mechanism that differentiates between subjective rep-
utation (observations), indirect reputation (positive re-
ports by others), and functional reputation (task-specific
behavior), which are weighted for a combined reputa-
tion value that is used to make decisions about coop-
eration or gradual isolation of a node. Reputation val-
ues are obtained by regarding nodes as requesters and
providers, and comparing the expected result to the ac-
tually obtained result of a request. Again, nodes only
rely on first-hand observations and do not exchange rep-
utation information. A performance analysis by simula-
tion is stated for future work.
A context-aware inference mechanism has been pro-
posed by Paul and Westhoff [13], where accusations are
related to the context of a unique route discovery pro-
cess and a stipulated time period. The rating of nodes
is based on accusations of others, whereby a number of
accusations pointing to a single attack, the approximate
knowledge of the topology, and context-aware inference
are claimed to enable a node to rate an accused node
without doubt. An accusation has to come from several
nodes, otherwise the only node making the accusation
is itself accused of misbehavior. While this mechanism
discourages wrong accusations, it potentially also dis-
courages correct accusations for fear of being the only
denouncer.
3 Robustness vs. Efficiency
Relying exclusively on first-hand observations in-
creases the detection time when compared to an ap-
proach that also uses reports from others, i.e., rumors.
The more information is available, the faster the detec-
tion, however, rumors can destabilize a reputation sys-
tems when nodes make wrong observations or deliber-
atly lie to worsen the reputation of another node. The ro-
bustness problem caused by slander can potentially out-
weigh the benefit obtained by a shorter detection time.
Not considering the opinion of others is just one way to
avoid destabilization by way of wrong accusations. To
the same end, many reputation systems build on posi-
tive reputation only [16]. Some couple privileges to ac-
cumulated good reputation, e.g. for exchange of gaming
items or auctioning [15].Positive reputation systems of-
fer the implicit disincentive to change identifiers since
reputations are built over time and having a long history
of cooperation helps nodes to be chosen. Slander is not
an issue in positive reputation systems, since no nega-
tive information is kept [10, 7]. Negative reputation sys-
tems offer more scalability under the assumption that
misbehavior is the exception and not the norm.
We deem the combined use of both positive and nega-
tive reputation adequate for the context of mobile ad-
hoc networks, as we are interested in the cooperation
factor calculated as the frequency of misbehavior rela-
tive to the total activity of a node in a network. More-
over, the nature of the rumors should match the na-
ture of first-hand observations or experiences. If a node
keeps track of both positive and negative behavior of
other nodes, the rumors considered should reflect the
same kind of knowledge in order not to introduce a bias
in either direction.
As opposed to the Byzantine Generals problem, the
nodes do not have to reach a consensus on which nodes
misbehave. Each node can keep its own belief of the
network denoted by the reputation system entries and
it can choose to consider the beliefs of other nodes or
to rely solely on its own observations. One node can
have varying reputation records with other nodes across
the network, and the subjective view of each node de-
termines its actions. Byzantine robustness [14] in the
sense of being able to tolerate a number of erratically
behaving servers or in this case nodes is the goal of a
reputation system in mobile ad-hoc networks. Here, the
detection of misbehaved nodes by means of the reputa-
tion systems has to be followed by a response in order
to render these nodes harmless.
4 A Bayesian Approach to Reputa-
tion Systems
4.1 Belief Representation
The main properties of a reputation system are the rep-
resentation of reputation, how the reputation is built
and updated, and for the latter, how the reputation
views of others are considered and integretated. We
propose to use a Bayesian approach for the represen-
tation and building of reputation as well as for sub-
sequent decision-making depending on the reputation.
Since the true probability of a node to act maliciously,
say
 
, is unknown, we make an estimation of
 
by in-
ference from the data obtained by direct or indirect ob-
servations. Bayes’s Theorem is shown in Equation 1. It
is used to calculate the probability of a random variable
given an observation.
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A so-called ‘prior’ distribution reflects the initial belief.
Any up-front information can be fed into the prior to
give it a head start. The prior, however, can also be
chosen such that it reflects ignorance or indifference
towards the initial situation. Given this prior, at each
observation the information available is updated to re-
flect the added knowledge and to increase the precision
of a belief. If the likelihood of a property is binomial,
i.e., successes and failures occur independently, a good
prior density is the Beta function. The Beta function is
the conjugate prior for binomial likelihood and thus the
posterior density is also Beta [2, 6]. The Beta function
is used to reflect the prior belief. It is defined as follows.
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A binomial likelihood is assumed as ﬂIJ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. The process of updating beliefs is as follows.
First, choose a prior. To represent a non-informative
prior and thus a uniform likelihood, we use QRSﬀMLUT8L .
Then calculate the posterior distribution and update at
each observation. We use V to represent the number
of successes and W for the number of failures. Then,
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The advantage of using the Beta function is that it only
needs two parameters Y and [ that are continuously up-
dated as observations are made or reported. These two
parameters reflect the current belief, the higher the Beta
curve, the more evidence samples have been taken in.
The higher the peak and the narrower, the higher the
confidence in the belief that there is a certain probabil-
ity around which the observations center.
Figure 1(a) shows the non-informative flat prior of
Beta(1,1), all probabilities of   are equally likely. Af-
ter some updates according to observations of successes
and failures, the posterior density is depicted in Fig-
ure 1(d). The actual calculation of the density has been
carried out here for illustrative purposes.
The Beta function offers moments that are simple to cal-
culate.
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Applied to a reputation system, every node, say i , has
a reputation component that receives as input first- or
second-hand behaviour observations on other nodes,
say j . It outputs decisions (misbehaving or not) for
those j s where node i feels able to say something. We
call k
ﬂl m
the summarized data that captures j ’s repu-
tation, seen by i . k ﬂl m is modified as observations are
received according to the update of the Beta function as
explained above.
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(b) Beta(2,2).
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(d) Beta(100,10).
Figure 1: Density of the beta function of various obser-
vations.
4.2 Decision Making
In a mobile ad-hoc network, the point of keeping repu-
tation records about other nodes of the network is to be
able to make more informed decisions about whether
to forward for another node, which path to choose,
whether to avoid another node and delete it from the
path cache, and whether to warn others about another
node. Using the Bayesian approach, decisions can be
made minimizing the risk for a loss, e.g., minimizing
the risk of wrong classification of events, of deeming
another node malicious, although it is not, or, vice versa,
the risk of not recognizing a node as malicious although
it actually misbehaves.
Loss can be represented as squared-error loss or 0-1
loss for classification, for instance, as depicted in equa-
tions 6 and 7.
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The decision-making process works as follows. First,
the posterior according to all the given data is calcu-
lated. Then, for all actions the loss is calculated and
weighted by its likelihood. Finally, the action  with
the smallest risk k (expected loss   ) is chosen from
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In this paper, we apply the Bayesian approach to repu-
tation updates, however, it can also serve for event clas-
sification of observations, i.e., whether they are regular
protocol events or malicious attacks, as well as for trust
classification to evaluate nodes according to their coop-
eration in the reputation system itself independent from
their cooperation in the routing and forwarding accord-
ing to the protocol.
4.3 Merging Models
To take advantage of rumors, i.e., to learn from obser-
vations made by others before having to learn by own
experience, we need a means of incorporating the repu-
tation beliefs into the view of an individual node.
In the particular case of misbehavior detection in mo-
bile ad-hoc networks we want to give the most em-
phasis on reputation built by actually observed behav-
ior, second-hand information should obtain less weight,
since a node trusts its own observations more than a re-
port from a random other node.
Once the weight has been determined, the entry of the
node that misbehaved is changed accordingly. If the rat-
ing of a node in the table has deteriorated so much as to
fall out of a tolerable range, the suspect node is declared
“detected“ and some action can be triggered.
There are several challenges for merging beliefs.
 False/fake belief models for deliberate deception
and influence.
 Contradicting models. How to consolidate them,
whom to believe, how to assign weights for signif-
icance.
 Privacy concerns. Nodes may not want to expose
their opinions to others, also there is a reduction of
uncertainty which might be beneficial to malicious
nodes.
 With whom to share information. Who provides
the most valuable information, who is trusted for
their opinion, and, related to the privacy concern,
whom can nodes show their beliefs without harm.
In their tutorial on Bayesian model averaging, Hoeting
et al. [8] give the following methodology.
If   is the quantity of interest, such as an effect size,
a future observable, or the utility of a course of action,
then its posterior distribution given data  is:
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This is an average of the posterior distributions un-
der each of the models considered, weighted by their
posterior model probability.
  TT
 are the models
considered. The posterior probability for model

 is
given by
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is the integrated likelihood of model


,
 
 is the
vector of parameters of model


,
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the prior density of the parameters under model   ,
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is the likelihood, and 	 
   is the prior
probability that   is the true model. All probabilities
are implicitely conditional on  , the set of all models
considered.
In addition, Davison [5] lists the following, with  being
the variable of interest, and  the data.
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Here
 

is the parameter for model h , under which
the prior is
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Berger [2] lists several methods for combining proba-
bilistic evidence. To process different sources of infor-
mation, he lists two ad-hoc systems.
Linear Opinion Pool. Assign a positive weight ﬂ 
(where ﬃ  ﬂ   L ) to each information source
ﬀ  (supposedly to reflect the confidence in that in-
formation source), and then use
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Independent Opinion Pool. When the information
sources seem “independent”, use, as the overall
probability distributions for
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The alternative to the use of ad-hoc rules is, accord-
ing to Berger, probabilistic modelling, i.e., obtaining
the joint distribution of all random observables and un-
known parameters of interest or, at least, determining
enough to calculate the conditional (posterior) distri-
bution of the desired
 
given the observables. This is
sometimes called the super Bayesian approach, to em-
phasize that it is a single decision maker (the super
Bayesian) who is trying to process all the information
to arrive at a distribution of
 
which is consistent with
probabilistic reasoning.
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In a first approach, we give the most weight to each
nodes’ own observations and we do not assume any
a priori knowledge on the trustworthiness or exper-
tise of a node. We thus weight second-hand reports
equally among the neighbors that issue these rumors.
The weight for each rumor at an exchange encounter is
thus


, ( being the number of neighbors at this particu-
lar instant. As a more advanced approach we could con-
ceive of modeling the trust given to particular nodes and
have the respective weight depend on it. A trust com-
ponent qualifies the trust that node i puts on second-
hand observations originated by other nodes, say
 
. We
call )
l
 the summarized data that captures the trust that
node i places on node  . ) l  could first be configured
by an external mechanism or be adaptive to the behav-
ior in rumor spreading. When the reputation system re-
ceives second-hand observations (from  , about j ), it
would then use ) ﬂl  to decide how to update k l m and to
determine whom to send rumors to.
4.4 Robustness Against Wrong Accusa-
tions
The question is how to detect and avoid wrong accusa-
tions. Our approach is to exclude those k  l m for which
there is a large incompatibility between k  l m and k l m
for some j . As a simple means to express that k 
l m
makes a strong case that j is bad, whereas k ﬂl m does
not, we exclude k  l m from the model merging if it devi-
ates from k
ﬂl m by more than   , the deviation threshold,
in either direction.
As mentioned previously, dynamic trust adaptation ac-
cording to the congruency metric given by this devia-
tion could be useful. However, we use the simpler ap-
proach of not discriminating between nodes and thus
treating each rumor on a case-by-case basis and eval-
uate its utility solely on the grounds of how much it
deviates from the belief the recipient already has. Trust
management is thus rendered obsolete in this particular
approach.
5 Simulation
5.1 Goals and Metrics
By means of simulation, we want to investigate the ro-
bustness and efficiency of a distributed reputation sys-
tem in a mobile ad-hoc network. The key questions ad-
dressed are
 How long does it take until a misbehaved node is
detected, using first-hand observations only, using
also second-hand information, i.e., the first-hand
observations of others, or even more indirect ru-
mors?
 What is the effect of wrong accusations and can
they be detected?
 What is the effect of varying trust models?
 How robust is the system to wrong observations?
 With whom should information be exchanged –
with neighbors or remote nodes? And, what is the
effect of mobility?
5.2 Methodology, Algorithms, and Pa-
rameters
5.2.1 Setup
The simulation was implemented in R [9, 17]. To simu-
late good and bad behavior, neighborhood, observation
mistakes, movement, and trust updates, we used a grid
of nodes. We investigated and compared the effect of
using first-hand observations only, using also second-
hand information in a network with no slander, and
using also second-hand information in a network with
liars but discarding too deviant opinions.
The nodes were placed in a grid, to simulate a com-
munications range of one hop, and they observed
the behavior of their neighborhood. Depending on
its position in the grid, a node has up to 8 neigh-
bors. A node can only directly observe neighbors,
i.e., node i at row j and column  , denoted as
i
m

, can observe any neighboring node ( in its row
(
mGl



P5
, in its column ( )m   m=P5!l  , or diago-
nally one hop away (  m   m=P5!l    P5 . Periodi-
cally, nodes move around. We emulate this with the fol-
lowing algorithm. We pick a node at random, say node
i
m l
 and randomly select a new location

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for it
such that j
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to keep the movement reasonably local. We then repeat
this with the node that we find at

j
\
T 
\

and so on, until
the new location is the original

j
T )
and the permuta-
tion cycle is completed.
Before each move, the nodes exchanged reputation in-
formation in the form of Beta parameters with their
neighbors. The liars reversed the reputation information
before giving it to the neighbors. This process was it-
erated until all of the malicious nodes were classified
as detected by all of the nodes in the network, which
was the case when the expected value of the reputa-
tion,
 ﬂR<QRS 
k
ﬂl m
exceeded a threshold of 0.75.
As a rehabilitation mechanism to mitigate the effect of
slander, the nodes periodically reviewed their reputation
opinions and reversed their opinion from “detected“ to
“regular” when the reputation was substantially better
than the detection threshold.
The threshold used to determine when to exclude a sus-
pect liar’s opinion depends on the priorities. As is typ-
ical for diagnosis systems, there is a trade-off between
minimizing false positives or false negatives. We chose
a threshold of 50% deviation to err on the side of false
positives, i.e., the mechanism excluded some true in-
formation but reliably prevented slander. This way the
robustness is maintained at the price of an unused detec-
tion speed-up potential. A side-effect of the emphasis
on robustness was that, given the nature of a node did
not change throughout the simulation time, the rehabili-
tation mechanism provided for the strategy of excluding
liars was never required.
5.2.2 Scenarios
 First-hand observations: (   i  denotes the nodes
that node i can observe during the time interval
R
, i.e. the grid neighbors. Each node j issues a
sequence of bits out of   T L  according to a dis-
tribution that depends on whether a node is good

 
R

 
R	
or bad   
R

 
R
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. Node i sees the bits
correctly with probability 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3. repeat
(a)  nodes output byte according to

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R
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 
R
 ﬃﬂ .
(b)  nodes i , observe neighbors ( correctly
with probability  .
(c)  nodes i , ( update k ﬂl  using the Beta
function.
4. until
R"!

,
 being the number of observa-
tions at each location.
5. Pick node, move until cycle completed. Re-
peat 1–3.
until end of simulation, then  nodes i and j eval-
uate k
ﬂl m
and compare to the R   Q m .
 Truthful second-hand observations: #   i 
1. Iterations of the algorithm above.
2. Periodically  nodes i and j output k ﬂl m .
3.  nodes i and j update k l m by integrating
local k
ﬂl m
and k  l m , the neighbors’ k l m . A
variant is to use only the delta between the
k

l m
received at the last encounter and the
current k 
l m
, this scenario is termed ’deltas
only’.
 Contaminated second-hand information: With lies
and excluding lies. info only We use probability
distributions
RQ%$&$
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 
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
 (probability of telling
the truth as a regular node) and RQ%$&$ )    R 
 S 
(probability of telling the truth when a node is a
liar). Independent of its status as a good or bad
type, nodes can be liars or truthful.
1. Iterations of second-hand algorithm, but
drawing from the probability distribution to
tell a lie or the truth. When a node
 
lies,
it swaps the
Y
and
[
of its ( 
l m YTG[
rep-
resented by k  l m before disclosing it to the
neighbors for model comparison.
2. Compare k l m with all neighbors
 
, weight
k

l m by


and integrate with k ﬂl m .
3. For another scenario, termed ’with lies’, in-
clude the contaminated information regard-
less. For the ’liars excluded’ scenario, when
comparing, only use k 
l m
s according to the
congruency metric, deviating less than  
from k
l m
, with   being the deviation thresh-
old and k ﬂl m the accumulated reputation of j
as seen by node i .
5.2.3 Parameters
Our parameters are network size, number of misbe-
haved nodes, number of liars, threshold for detection
(default: 0.75), number of observations before mov-
ing (default: 10), information type (first-hand, second-
hand, third-hand information, second-hand only con-
sidering deltas since last encounter, including lies, al-
lowing for liars but trying to exclude them), partners
for information exchange (default: neighbors, planned:
fixed set of nodes (friends), random set of nodes),
weight for model averaging (default


( ( being the
number of neighbors), planned: weight according to
adaptive trust function, full Bayesian model averag-
ing), and detection (threshold of      N   , loss func-
tion). We have probability distributions for R   Q (good
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5.3 Results
Figure 2 shows the maximum detection time, i.e., the
time in the simulation when the last node detected a
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Figure 2: Percentage of malicious nodes detected vs.
maximum detection time.
particular malicious node, vs. how many of the mali-
cious nodes were detected by all at that time, Figure 3
shows the mean detection time for all nodes. These ex-
amples are representative of the results obtained by the
simulation. We chose to show individual representative
examples instead of mean outcomes over several runs,
since the type of a node both concerning the coopera-
tion and the lying properties are drawn from probability
distributions and not explicitely specified, thus the por-
tion of malicious nodes or liars varies.
We used true second-hand information, even third-hand
information (which is not independent but reinforcing
beliefs by potentially mirroring them back to the orig-
inator, we only showed it for comparison), the delta to
previously received second-hand information only, con-
taminated second-hand information (which has the side
effect of wrong accusations), and contaminated second-
hand information but excluding deviating views.
Using the full set of second-hand observations or using
only the difference between already received second-
hand information and the current second-hand informa-
tion consistently perform very similarly and very well.
Exchanging the full set of observations when nodes en-
counter repeatedly considers information as new that
has been integrated already and thus can bias the belief,
whereas keeping track of the last exchanged informa-
tion, albeit only two parameters per reputation, can add
up to a significant storage requirement in large mobile
networks.
When nodes not only exchange their own first-hand ob-
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Figure 3: Percentage of malicious nodes detected vs.
mean detection time.
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Figure 4: Percentage of malicious nodes detected vs.
mean detection time.
servations but hand on rumors of a deeper transitivity
level, their own opinions once voiced can be reflected
to them at a later time, thus reinforcing their original
opinion. Although using this ’third-hand’ information
consistently outperforms all other strategies, it is not a
valid choice since these observations are not indepen-
dent.
As can be seen from Figures 4 and 5, the performance of
the Bayesian approach of liar exclusion improves when
the number of liars is small and approaches the perfor-
mance of truthful second-hand information. In the pres-
ence of many liars, the performance degrades gradually
but is still better than relying only on first-hand obser-
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Figure 5: Percentage of malicious nodes detected vs.
mean detection time.
vations. In all the figures, the scenario ‘with lies’, i.e.,
integrating contaminated second-hand information re-
gardless, performs better than relying on first-hand ob-
servations only, yet the price for this speed-up in detec-
tion time is that innocent nodes are also being classified
as ‘detected’ by many nodes due to the effect of wrong
accusations. This has consistently been avoided by the
‘liars excluded’ scenarios throughout the entire simula-
tion.
Over the course of the simulation, it has emerged that
using the ‘liars excluded’ Bayesian scenario signifi-
cantly improves on the performance of the mean de-
tection time when compared to the ‘first hand’ sce-
nario, yet the performance gain is even higher in the
worst case, namely the maximum detection time, i.e.,
the maximum time it takes for a malicious node to be
deemed ‘detected’ by all the nodes of the network.
Another observation is that, as one would expect, the
detection improvement given by the use of second-hand
information even in the presence of liars, but given the
attempt to discard the wrong accusations by means of
our Bayesian approach, in fact increases with the net-
work size. The larger the network, the higher the proba-
bility of receiving information about nodes before actu-
ally encountering them as neighbors and being able to
observe their behavior.
6 Discussion and Future Work
In addition to more simulation runs to get confidence in-
tervals (or Bayesian credible sets) and exploring a larger
space of parameters, we are working on an implementa-
tion of the Bayesian approach in a more realistic mobile
ad-hoc network environment and extending the existing
CONFIDANT protocol by the new Bayesian approach
to incorporate the insights gained to make the protocol
robust against wrong accusations yet reasonably fast in
detection.
With a more realistic setting and mobility model, we
can then investigate the effect of changing the part-
ners with whom to exchange rumors. Exchanging in-
formation exclusively with the current neighbors has
the advantage that rumors do not have to be relayed
by other nodes and thus keep the traffic local, however,
the effect of receiving rumors from more remote nodes,
fixed or random, could add the benefit of learning more
about other nodes before having to learn from experi-
ence but potentially more useless information could get
distributed than in a local exchange scenario.
An important next step is to come up with a detailed
model of the adversary. For instance an adversary could
try to create instabilities by lying only so much as to
not be discarded at the model merging stage, yet suf-
ficiently to worsen another nodes’ reputation gradually
over time. The current system is dampening the effect
of wrong accusations by forcing liars to lie more to have
a fast effect, but then detection is easier. To combat the
slow deliberate degradation of reputation, we intend to
introduce an aging mechanism of reputation into the
simulation.
7 Conclusions
Using second-hand information can significantly accel-
erate the detection and subsequent isolation of mali-
cious nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks. If nodes are de-
ceived by wrong observations or slander, the robustness
of the reputation system is endangered. We found that,
enabled by our Bayesian approach, by exluding opin-
ions that deviate substantially from first-hand observa-
tion and the majority opinion of second-hand opinions
gathered over time, the robustness of the reputation sys-
tem remains intact even with a large number of liars in
the network, while the detection speed still improves
over merely using first-hand observations and, with a
decreasing portion of liars, approximates the ideal case
of using truthful second-hand information.
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